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DEATH PENALTY FOR BATTERED WOMEN*
VICTOR L. STREIB**
W OMEN who have been battered by their husbands, lovers, and
companions understandably have received an outpouring of
concern. I The criminal justice system has been encouraged to .protect
these women more completely2 and to punish their batterers more ag-
gressively.' When the system fails and these women kill their batterers
or others, law is asked to stretch and bend to allow expanded defense
0 This Article is based substantially on a paper, entitled "Battered Women's Syndrome as
a Defense and Mitigating Factor in Capital Cases," presented by the author at the Capital Pun-
ishment Symposium sponsored by the Florida State University Law Review in Tallahassee, Flor-
ida, on February 7, 1992. To a less substantial degree the Article is also based on a paper,
entitled "Gender-Specific Issues in the Cases of Death-Sentenced and Executed Female Offen-
ders," presented by the author and Dr. Lynn Sametz at the 50th anniversary meeting of the
American Society of Criminology in San Francisco, California, on November 23, 1991. Copies
of both papers are available from the author.
** Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University. As
an attorney, the author has represented women on death row. See, e.g., Cooper v. State, 540
N.E.2d 1216 (Ind. 1989).
1. See, e.g., Julie Blackman & Ellen Brickman, The Impact of Expert Testimony on Trials
of Battered Women Who Kill Their Husbands, 2 BERAV. Sci. & L. 413 (1984); Rick Brown,
Limitations on Expert Testimony on the Battered Woman Syndrome in Homicide Cases: The
Return of the Ultimate Issue Rule, 32 ARiz. L. REv. 665 (1990); Diane R. Follingstad et al.,
Factors Predicting Verdicts in Cases Where Battered Women Kill Their Husbands, 13 LAW &
HuM. BEHAV. 253 (1989); Cynthia L. Coffee, Comment, A Trend Emerges: A State Survey on
the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Concerning the Battered Woman Syndrome, 25 J. FAM.
L. 373 (1986-87); Meridith B. Cross, Note, The Expert as Educator: A Proposed Approach to
the Use of Battered Woman Syndrome Expert Testimony, 35 VAND. L. REV. 741 (1982); Sara E.
Hauptfuehrer, Note, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Admissibility of Expert Testimony on
the Battered Woman Syndrome in Virginia, 10 GEo. MASON U. L. REv. 171 (1987); Rebecca A.
Kultgen, Note, Battered Woman Syndrome: Admissibility of Expert Testimony for the Defense,
47 Mo. L. REv. 835 (1982); M. Julianne Leary, Note, A Woman, a Horse, and a Hickory Tree:
The Development of Expert Testimony on the Battered Woman Syndrome in Homicide Cases,
53 UMKC L. REV. 386 (1985); Annie E. Thar, Comment, The Admissibility of Expert Testi-
mony on Battered Wife Syndrome: An Evidentiary Analysis, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 348 (1982);
Thomas B. Waltrip, Note, Evidence-The Battered Woman Syndrome in Illinois: Admissibility
of Expert Testimony, 11 S. ILL. U. L.J. 137 (1986).
2. See, e.g., Michael A. Buda & Teresa L. Butler, The Battered Wife Syndrome: A Back-
door Assault on Domestic Violence, 23 J. FMA. L. 359 (1984-85); Helen R. Holden, Comment,
Does the Legal System Batter Women? Vindicating Battered Women's Constitutional Rights to
Adequate Police Protection, 21 ARIz. ST. L.J. 705 (1989).
3. See, e.g., Margaret Howard, Husband-Wife Homicide: An Essay from a Family Law
Perspective, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (1986); Kathleen Waits, The Criminal Justice Sys-
tem's Response to Battering: Understanding the Problem, Forging the Solutions, 60 WAsH. L.
REv. 267 (1985).
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theories ranging in effect from reducing the seriousness of the crime
to complete exoneration.
4
This Article asks much less. The proposition here is to require the
capital sentencing process to consider battering as a mitigating factor
and, in the most severe cases, to exclude battered women from eligi-
bility for the death sentence altogether. Even if they should be con-
victable for their homicides, the spectacle of executing battered
women seems particularly difficult to justify.
Before exploring special treatment for battered women in capital
sentencing, this Article sketches the background of the death penalty
for female offenders. Brief empirical evidence as to executions, recent
death sentences, and women now on death row is considered first to
provide a context for the narrow thesis on battered women. This con-
text reflects the modest number of offenders involved and therefore
the greatly circumscribed sweep of the proposed statutory amend-
ments as to battered women. Finally, specific means are suggested to
4. For discussions on reducing the seriousness of the crime, see, e.g., Susannah M. Ben-
nett, Comment, Ending the Continuous Reign of Terror: Sleeping Husbands, Battered Wives,
and the Right of Self-Defense, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 959 (1989); Rocco C. Cipparone, Jr.,
Comment, The Defense of Battered Women Who Kill, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 427 (1987); Thomas
G. Kieviet, Comment, The Battered Wife Syndrome: A Potential Defense to a Homicide
Charge, 6 PEPP. L. REv. 213 (1978); Mira Mihajlovich, Comment, Does Plight Make Right: The
Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony and the Law of Self-Defense, 62 IND. L.J. 1253
(1987); Marilyn H. Mitchell, Note, Does Wife Abuse Justify Homicide?, 24 WAYNE L. REv.
1705 (1978); Doris Del Tosto, Comment, The Battered Spouse Syndrome as a Defense to a
Homicide Charge Under the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, 26 ViuL. L. REv. 105 (1980). Discus-
sions urging the use of complete or partial self-defense theory can be found in Jacqueline R.
Castel, Discerning Justice for Battered Women Who Kill, 48 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 229
(1990); Phyllis L. Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill Men in Self-
Defense, 8 HARv. WO tEN'S L.J. 121 (1985); Victoria M. Mather, The Skeleton in the Closet:
The Battered Woman Syndrome, Self-Defense, and Expert Testimony, 39 MERCER L. REV. 545
(1988); Cathryn J. Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a Historical Accident on Be-
half of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 Am. U. L. REv. 11 (1986); Mary A. Baumann, Comment,
Expert Testimony on the Battered Wife Syndrome: A Question of Admissibility in the Prosecu-
tion of the Battered Wife for the Killing of Her Husband, 27 ST. Louis U. L.J. 407 (1983);
Clement Brown, Note, Expert Testimony on Battered Woman Syndrome: Its Admissibility in
Spousal Homicide Cases, 19 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 877 (1985); Donald L. Creach, Note, Partially
Determined Imperfect Self-Defense: The Battered Wife Kills and Tells Why, 34 STAN,. L. REv.
615 (1982); Loraine P. Eber, Note, The Battered Wife's Dilemma: To Kill or To Be Killed, 32
HASTNGos L.J. 895 (1981); Carolyn W. Kaas, Comment, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony
on the Battered Woman Syndrome in Support of a Claim of Self-Defense, 15 CONN. L. REv. 121
(1982); Jill S. Talbot, Note, Is "Psychological Self-Defense" a Solution to the Problem of De-
fending Battered Women Who Kill?, 45 WAsH. & LEE L. Rev. 1527 (1988); Roberta K. Thy-
fault, Comment, Self-Defense: Battered Woman Syndrome on Trial, 20 CAL. W. L. REv. 485
(1984). Far less of the literature challenges the appropriateness of this type of evidence. See, e.g.,
David L. Faigman, Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A Legal and Em-
pirical Dissent, 72 VA. L. REv. 619 (1986); Note, Rendering Each Woman Her Due: Can a
Battered Woman Claim Self-Defense When She Kills Her Sleeping Batterer?, 38 KAN. L. REv.
169 (1989).
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insure that (1) all battered women capitally charged receive the bene-
fits of express mitigating factors on battering and (2) the most extenu-
ated battered women cases are excused from capital punishment
altogether.
1. DATA SOURCES
This analysis requires briefly considering three data sets, each hav-
ing a different source. First are the total number of lawful executions
in American history as documented by Watt Espy.' Espy's research
has become well-known among capital punishment researchers as he
has worked since 1970 to document lawful executions occurring
throughout American history.' An attempt was made to reduce his
files to a computer-readable data file in the mid-1980s,7 but Espy has
since repudiated that effort as not resulting in an accurate compilation
and as not continuing to add cases recently documented. The numbers
reported in that effort and other earlier compilations of female
executions' now should be considered as superceded by Espy's contin-
uously updated listings.
Espy's current report9 lists a total of 18,309 confirmed executions
by the fifty states and the federal government. Espy also separately
identifies 501 executions of females. It is this list of 501 female execu-
tions from Espy's current report that constitutes the first data set ana-
lyzed in this Article.
The second data set consists of the ninety-two death sentences im-
posed on female offenders from January 1, 1973, through May 15,
5. The leading effort nationally to document each and every lawful execution in the United
States and its predecessor colonies and territories has been conducted for nearly a quarter of a
century by Watt Espy, Director of the Capital Punishment Research Project, Headland, Ala-
bama 36345. His most recent report is Watt Espy, List of Confirmations, State-by-State, of
Legal Executions as of May 20, 1992 (unpublished report available from Capital Punishment
Research Project).
6. Watt Espy, Capital Punishment and Deterrence: What the Statistics Cannot Show, 26
CRrME & DEUNQ. 537 (1980).
7. See Victoria Schneider & John 0. Smykla, A Summary of Executions in the United
States, 1608-1987: The Espy File, in THE DEATH PENALTY rN AmERICA: CURRENT RasEARCn 1
(Robert M. Bohm ed. 1991); Watt Espy & John 0. Smykla, Executions in the United States,
1608-1987: The Espy File (1987) (computer-readable file produced by John Smykla, Tuscaloosa,
Ala., and distributed by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, Ann
Arbor, Mich.).
8. Elizabeth Rapaport, The Death Penalty and Gender Discrimination, 25 LAW & Soc'Y
REV. 367 (1991) (hereinafter Rapaport (1991)); Elizabeth Rapaport, Some Questions About Gen-
der and the Death Penalty, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 501 (1990) (hereinafter Rapaport
(1990)); Victor L. Streib, Death Penalty for Female Offenders, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 845 (1990);
Victor L. Streib & Lynn Sametz, Executing Female Juveniles, 22 CONN. L. REV. 3 (1989).
9. Watt Espy's May 20, 1992, report, supra note 5, provides the data on which the analysis
in this Article is based. New reports are issued regularly by Espy as events dictate.
1992]
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1992.10 These ninety-two death sentences were identified by checking
each annual volume of the federal reports," particularly for the older
cases. The more recent cases were also identified by checking the peri-
odic issues of Death Row, U.S.A. ' 2 Also helpful was the network of
contacts among death penalty groups around the country who readily
share information when a female receives the death sentence. 3 This
information about the cases was then augmented and verified from
newspaper clippings and from attorneys involved in the cases. These
evolving data are regularly reported in a periodic newsletter on capital
punishment for female offenders. '4
The third data set consists of the forty-three death sentences in
force as of May 15, 1992.'1 Files on each of these cases have been
compiled beginning with the sentencing dates for the women involved.
Data for each of the cases comes from newspaper clippings, attorneys'
records, court opinions, and other data collection efforts such as
Death Row, U.S.A.
II. EXECUTIONS
Espy has documented 501 lawful executions of female offenders-
less than 3% of the total of 18,309 executions occurring within the
United States.' 6 These executions of female offenders have occurred in
thirty-four states and the District of Columbia. Espy's data compila-
tion does not separately identify executions under federal jurisdictions
but lists them under the geographical jurisdiction in which the execu-
tions actually took place. While these jurisdictions cover every census
region within the United States, they are distributed quite unevenly
among those regions.
Table I shows female executions as a percentage of all executions
for the nine states of the Northeast Region. While New England Divi-
sion totals almost as many female executions as the Mid-Atlantic Divi-
10. Victor L. Streib, Capital Punishment for Female Offenders: Present Female Death Row
Inmates and Death Sentences and Executions of Female Offenders (Jan. 1, 1973, to May 1,
1992) (unpublished quarterly report available from author). To the 89 sentences listed in this
report should be added the three additional death sentences imposed upon Aileen Wuornos on
May 15, 1992, in Ocala, Florida. See Roadside Killer Handed 3 More Death Sentences, MIAM
HERALD, May 16, 1992, at 5B.
11. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., DEP'T OF JUST., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 19-(1973-90).
12. DEATH Row, U.S.A. (NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, New York, N.Y.), 1983-91
[hereinafter NAACP].
13. See, e.g., NAT'L CoALmON To AaOuSH THE DEATH PENALTY, TrE 1992 AaOLITIONIST'S
DIRECTORY (1991).
14. Streib, supra note 10.
15. Streib, supra note 10.
16. Espy, supra note 5.
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sion, New England's female executions constitute more than 10% of
all executions in that division while the Mid-Atlantic Division's female
executions constitute only 3% of all executions there. Another major
difference is that the vast bulk of the New England cases are from the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries while the Mid-Atlantic cases
range well into the twentieth century.'7
Female executions in the North Central Region are arrayed in Table
2. While Missouri and Ohio are the leaders, it generally can be said
that executions of female offenders in this region are quite rare, as are
executions of male offenders. One oddity is Michigan, normally
thought of as a leading abolitionist state. However, Michigan exe-
cuted thirteen persons in earlier centuries and two of them were fe-
male offenders. The small numbers involved give Michigan the
dubious honor of having the highest percentage (1507o) of its execu-
tions being those of female offenders, highest not only in this region
but in the entire United States.
Table 3 verifies, predictably, that the South Region leads the nation
in sheer numbers of total executions and of female executions (see Ta-
TABLE 1
TOTAL EXECUTIONS AND EXECUTIONS OF FEMALE
OFFENDERS IN THE NORTHEAST CENSUS REGION
Division Total Female Percentage
State Executions Executions of Total
New England Division:
Connecticut
Maine
Massachussetts
New Hampshire
Rhode Island
Vermont
900
706
12076
1304
4%
706
Division Totals: 718 73 10%
Mid-A tlantic Division:
New Jersey 460 14 3070
New York 1,307 36 3%
Pennsylvania 1,073 27 3 %o
Division Totals: 2,840 77 3%
Regional Totals: 3,558
17. See Streib, supra note 8, at 855-59.
Source: Wat Espy, List of Confirmations, State-by-State, of Legal Executions as of May 20,
1992 (unpublished report available from Capital Punishment Research Project).
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TABLE 2
TOTAL EXECUTIONS AND EXECUTIONS OF FEMALE
OFFENDERS IN THE NORTH CENTRAL CENSUS REGION
Division
State
East North Central Division:
Illinois
Indiana
Michigan
Ohio
Wisconsin
Total Female Percentage
Executions Executions of Total
Division Totals: 992 8 1%
West North Central Division:
Iowa 47 - -
Kansas 75 - -
Minnesota 68 1 1 070
Missouri 362 6 2%
Nebraska 37 -
North Dakota 8 -
South Dakota 15 -
Division Totals: 612 7 1 %
Regional Totals: 1,604 15 1%
Source: Watt Espy, List of Confirmations, State-by-State, of Legal Executions as of May 20,
1992 (unpublished report available from Capital Punishment Research Project).
ble 5 below for a comparative analysis of the regions). Within this
region, the South Atlantic Division accounts for 75% (243 of 325) of
the region's executions and 49% (243 of 501) of female executions in
the entire nation. Virginia is the unchallenged leader with 112 female
executions, but this extraordinarily high number still constitutes less
than 6% of Virginia's total of 2,033 executions (also the highest na-
tionally). Well behind Virginia but still exceptional is Maryland, with
forty-nine (6%) of its 757 executions being of female offenders.
States within the South Region that are exceptional at the other end
of the spectrum are Florida and Texas. These two states are leaders
among death penalty states today" but are generally in the middle of
the pack in total executions historically. As for female executions,
Florida has executed only one female and Texas has executed only
three females. Florida is in striking contrast to its neighboring states
18. See NAACP, supra note 12, at 4 (Winter 1991); Execution Pace Climbs as Appeals Run
Course, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1992, at B9.
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TABLE 3
TOTAL EXECUTIONS AND EXECUTIONS OF FEMALE
OFFENDERS IN THE SOUTH CENSUS REGION
Division
State
South Atlantic Division:
Delaware
District Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Maryland
North Carolina
South Carolina
Virginia
West Virginia
Total Female Percentage
Executions Executions of Total
89
121
525
1,145
757
1,019
888
2,033
168
Division Totals: 6,745 243 4%
East South Central Division:
Alabama 768 17 206
Kentucky 513 16 3%.
Mississippi 536 8 1%
Tennessee 406 5 110
Division Totals: 2,223 46 2%.
West South Central Division:
Arkansas 554 4 1 00
Louisiana 995 28 3W%
Oklahoma 168 1 1 %
Texas 894 3 -
Division Totals: 2,611 36 100
Regional Totals: 11,579
Source: Wait Espy, List of Confirmations, State-by-State. of Legal Executions as of May 20,
1992 (unpublished report available from Capital Punishment Research Project).
of Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina, all with 201o to 3% of their
total executions being those of female offenders. The Texas experi-
ence may be explained more by comparing it to its neighbors in the
southwest, all of which seem extremely reluctant to execute female of-
fenders. For example, Oklahoma, 19 Colorado, and New Mexico 0 total
only two executed females among their 361 executions.
19. Seetbl. 3.
20. See infra tWI. 4.
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Table 4 indicates that the West Region appears to be the most reluc-
tant to execute female offenders. Only eleven such executions have
occurred, and California accounts for seven of them. In many of the
states steeped most deeply in the mystique of the old west, such as
Colorado, Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming, no females have ever been
executed. California's 729 total executions and seven female execu-
tions dominate the figures from the entire region. If California is re-
moved from consideration in this region, then only four (0.5%) of the
838 total executions have been of female offenders. By any measure,
this indicates that execution of female offenders has been almost un-
heard of in the western states.
Table 5 brings together all four census regions. Comparison of the
gross numbers of female executions suggests that the North Central
Region and the West Region can be ignored, because together they
have accounted for only 5qo (26 of 501) of all female executions.
However, viewed from the opposite perspective, why have less than
1070 (26 of 3,172) of the executions in these areas of the country been
of female offenders?
TABLE 4
Division
State
TOTAL EXECUTIONS AND EXECUTIONS OF FEMALE
OFFENDERS IN THE WEST CENSUS REGION
Total Female Percen
Executions Executions of T
Mountain Division:
Arizona
Colorado
Idaho
Montana
Nevada
New Mexico
Utah
Wyoming
tage
otal
Division Totals: 543 4 1%
Pacyqc Division:
Alaska 12 -
California 729 7 1 %
Hawaii 49 -
Oregon 128 -
Washington 107 -
Division Totals: 1,025 7 1 %
Regional Totals: 1,568 11 1%
Source: Watt Espy, List of Confirmations, State-by-State, of Legal Executions as of May 20,
1992 (unpublished report available from Capital Punishment Research Project).
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TABLE 5
TOTAL EXECUTIONS AND EXECUTIONS OF FEMALE
OFFENDERS BY CENSUS REGION AND DIVISION
Division
State
Northeast Region:
New England
Mid-Atlantic
Total Female Percentage
Executions Executions of Total
718
2,840
10%
3%
Regional Totals: 3,558 150 4%
North Central Region:
E. No. Central 992 8 1%
W. No. Central 612 7 1%
Regional Totals: 1,604 15 1%
South Region:
So. Atlantic 6,745 243 4%
E. So. Atlantic 2,223 46 2%
W. So. Atlantic 2,611 36 100
Regional Totals: 11,579 325 3%
West Region:
Mountain 543 4 1 %
Pacific 1,025 7 1 %
Regional Totals: 1,568 11 1%
National Totals: 18,309 501 3%
Source: Watt Espy, List of Confirmations, State-by-State, of Legal Executions as of May 20,
1992 (unpublished report available from Capital Punishment Research Project).
Similarly, the Northeastern Region might be ignored in analyses of
current trends, as almost all of the 150 female executions there were in
centuries past. At least a large portion of these 150 executions may be
attributed to the bizarre fear of witches in the late-seventeenth and
early-eighteenth centuries." Almost all states in this region today ei-
ther have no death penalty at all or only a minimally active death pen-
alty system as compared to those of the southeastern states.
Clearly the South is the major contributor to female executions.
The South accounts for 65% (325 of 501) of female cases as compared
to 63% (11,579 of 18,309) of all executions. And as is documented in
the section below on recent death sentences for female offenders, the
South continues its leadership position in this practice.
21. See Streib, supra note 8, at 857.
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Table 6 displays the number of female executions for all thirty-five
jurisdictions and ranks them as to quantity of female executions. Vir-
ginia's 112 female executions is astounding, more than double that of
any other jurisdiction and nearly a quarter of the entire national total.
However, this runaway leadership position apparently has been aban-
doned by Virginia. No female offenders have been sentenced to death
there during the current era of the death penalty,2 preventing any
chance of additional female executions in Virginia at least for the near
future.
Maryland ranks second in the number of female executions. While
Maryland continues to have a death penalty and occasionally still sen-
tences female offenders to death,23 Maryland's Governor commuted
the sentences of all of the women on Maryland's death row in Decem-
ber 1987.24 At least for the time being, this has prevented any possibil-
ity of additional female executions there.
TABLE 6
JURISDICTIONS THAT HAVE EXECUTED FEMALE
OFFENDERS BY RANK AND NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS
Jurisdiction
Virginia
Maryland
Massachusetts
New York
Louisiana
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
North Carolina
Georgia
Alabama
Kentucky
Connecticut
New Jersey
Delaware
Mississippi
California
Missouri
Tennessee
Number
112
49
48
36
28
27
27
21
20
17
16
15
14
8
8
7
6
5
Rank Jurisdiction
19. Arkansas
Ohio
West Virginia
22. New Hampshire
Rhode Island
Texas
25. Arizona
Illinois
Maine
Michigan
Vermont
30. Dist. of Columbia
Florida
Minnesota
New Mexico
Nevada
Oklahoma
TOTAL: 501
Source: Watt Espy, List of Confirmations, State-by-State. of Legal Erecutions as of May 20,
1992 (unpublished report available from Capital Punishment Research Project).
22. See infra tbl. 10.
23. See infra tbl. 10.
24. Rapapon (1990), supra note 8, at 534 n. 114.
Rank
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
16.
17.
18.
Number
4
4
4
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
21
1
1
1
1
1
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Also high on the list of female executions are New York and Massa-
chusetts, neither of which currently has any death penalty at all and so
are not adding to their totals. North Carolina ranks eighth on the list
and is the only jurisdiction with a recent female execution . 2  North
Carolina is now sentencing female offenders at a rapid pace in the
current era 26 and thus is more likely than other jurisdictions to in-
crease its total female executions.
Some of the states very low on the list, such as Florida, Oklahoma,
and Texas, have largely avoided the execution of female offenders in
the past. However, these states now are sentencing women to death at
a comparatively strong pace and thus appear to be changing their
practice in that regard .27
Table 7 names those states that have never made the female execu-
tions list at all. These states constitute a solid block of the northwest-
ern quarter of the United States. This block begins with Washington
and Oregon and sweeps eastward, down through Colorado and up
through the Dakotas, ending in the upper midwest. Along the borders
of this solid block are states such as Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico,
and Oklahoma with only one female execution each, and Arizona, Il-
linois, and Michigan with two each.
Even though the sixteen states listed in Table 7 have executed 894
people over several centuries, none have been female offenders. No
doubt some of this can be explained in part by the scarcity of women
during the settlement period of the old west and by other factors, but
TABLE 7
JURISDICTIONS THAT HAVE
NEVER EXECUTED FEMALE OFFENDERS
Total Total Total
State Executions State Executions State Executions
Alaska 12 Kansas 75 Utah 47
Colorado 103 Montana 72 Washington 107
Hawaii 49 Nebraska 37 Wisconsin 5
Idaho 26 North Dakota 8 Wyoming 23
Indiana 142 Oregon 128 -
Iowa 47 South Dakota 15 TOTAL: 894
Source: Watt Espy, List of Confirmations, State-by-State, of Legal Executions as of May 20,
1992 (unpublished report available from Capital Punishment Research Project).
25. North Carolina executed Velma Barfield on November 2, 1984. See Joseph Ingle, Final
Hours: The Execution of Velma Barfield, 23 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 221 (1989); Woman Executed in
North Carolina, N.Y. Trums, Nov. 3, 1984, at 1.
26. See infra tbl. 10.
27. See infra tbl. 10.
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it remains surprising that the death penalty in this quarter of the
United States always has been reserved in practice solely for male of-
fenders.
Another surprising discovery about the executions of female offen-
ders is the remarkable decline in this practice during this century.
While an incomplete data set compared to Espy's current data list, an
earlier compilation revealed that only thirty-nine females have been
executed in this century, less than any century in our past. 28 In addi-
tion to the precipitous fall in total female executions in this century,
consider the change in the race of offenders executed over time.
Blacks constituted 5% of those executed females for whom race is
known in the seventeenth century, 70% in the eighteenth century, and
83% in the nineteenth century.2 9 However, only 34% of the females
executed so far in the twentieth century were black. 0 Correspond-
ingly, the percentage of whites among these executed females dropped
dramatically during the first three centuries, from 95% in the seven-
teenth century to only 15% in the nineteenth century, but rose to 66%
of those females executed in the twentieth century.3
Actual execution of female offenders continues to be a very rare
phenomenon. The last female offender executed was Velma Barfield
in North Carolina on November 2, 1984,32 the only female among 175
offenders executed thus far in the current era. Given the low rate of
death sentences for females, their actual execution is likely to remain
rare in the future.
IIl. FEMALE DEATH SENTENCES, JANUARY 1, 1973, TO MAY 15, 1992
The current American death penalty era began when new capital
punishment statutes were passed following the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Furman v. Georgia,33 which in effect struck down all then-
existing death penalty statutes. Sentencing began under the new sta-
tutes in late 1972, although most 1972 death sentences were based on
pre-Furman statutes and thus were destined to be invalidated when the
state appellate courts implemented Furman. By January 1, 1973,
death sentences being handed down in the various jurisdictions were
only under post-Furman statutes and thus this date provides a fairly
28. See Streib, supra note 8, at 855-59.
29. See Streib, supra note 8, at 856-57.
30. See Streib, supra note 8, at 856-57.
31. See Streib, supra note 8, at 856-57.
32. Ingle, supra note 25; Woman Executed in North Carolina, supra note 25.
33. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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clear beginning point for this analysis. Sentencing under these post-
Furman statutes continues through the present.3 4
From 1973 to 1992, ninety-two death sentences have been imposed
on eighty-five female offenders." Four women received two death sen-
tences each: Andrea Jackson in Florida, Doris Foster in Maryland,
Pamela Perillo in Texas, and Debra Brown in Indiana and Ohio. 36 The
cases of Jackson, Foster, and Perillo involved subsequent death sen-
tences after a first death sentence had been reversed. Brown's case
involved two separate death sentences for separate crimes in different
states. Aileen Wuornos received four death sentences in Florida for
the four murders for which she was convicted. Because the focus of
this Article is the death sentencing phenomenon, all ninety-two sen-
tences are included and analyzed even though they affect only eighty-
five persons.
Table 8 includes the data for the Northeast Region for this time
period. Almost no female death sentencing activity occurred here ex-
cept in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, with one such sentence each.
Because this region accounts for 30%/0 (150 of 501) of all female execu-
tions, 37 it might have been expected to have a more substantial female
death sentencing rate. Massachusetts and New York are third and
fourth respectively on the list of most frequent executors of female
offenders throughout American history and now they have no death
penalties at all. Even though a few of these states retain the penalty at
some minimal level, it seems apparent that no state in the Northeast
Region will become a leader in female death sentencing or executions
in the foreseeable future.
Table 9 covers the North Central Region. It suggests that this region
is continuing its use of capital punishment for female offenders, at
least in imposing such sentences on them. The clear leader is Ohio
with nine such sentences, accounting for nearly half of the sentences
in this twelve-state region. In the East North Central Division, Michi-
gan and Wisconsin have no death penalty at all and the death penalty
states (Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio) in this division are all sentencing
females as well as males. Interestingly, Indiana has never executed any
females in its entire history, 8 but is sentencing them to death at a
fairly steady pace during the current era.
34. May 15, 1992, is the cutoff date for purposes of the analyses in this Article.
35. Streib, supra note 10.
36. Streib, supra note 10.
37. See supra tbl. S.
38. See supra tbl. 2.
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TABLE 8
DEATH SENTENCES FOR FEMALE OFFENDERS IN THE
NORTHEAST CENSUS REGION BY RACE OF OFFENDER AND
PERIOD SENTENCED, 1973-92
Division Race Period Sentenced
State B W '73-75 '76-80 '81-85 '86-90 '91-92 Totals
New England Division:
Connecticut - - - - - - - -
Maine - - - - - - - -
Massachusetts - - - - - - - -
New Hampshire - - - - - - - -
Rhode Island - - - - - - - -
Vermont - - - - - - - -
Div. Totals - - - - - - - -
Mid-Atlantic Division:
New Jersey - 1 - - 1 - - 1
New York - - -.. .
Pennsylvania 2 - - - 1 1 2
Div. Totals 2 1 - - 1 1 1 3
Reg. Totals 2 1 - - 1 1 1 3
Source: Victor L. Streib, Capital Punishment for Female Offenders: Present Female Death Row
Inmates and Death Sentences and Executions of Female Offenders (Jan. 1, 1973, to May 1,
1992) (unpublished quarterly report available from author).
In the West North Central Division of the North Central Region,
only Missouri is sentencing female offenders to death. 9 The other
states in this region either have no death penalty at all or sentence very
few offenders of either gender to death under their capital punishment
systems. 4° Missouri leads this division with six female executions
throughout its history4' and continues to lead in death-sentencing
women in the current era.
Table 10 reveals the geographical location of the heaviest female
death-sentencing activity, the South Region. While this regional lead-
ership is not surprising, the activity levels within individual states
would not have been predicted either from their history of female
executions42 or their present involvement in the death penalty in gen-
eral. 4
39. See infra tbl. 9.
40. See infra tbl. 9.
41. See supra tbl. 2.
42. See supra tbl. 3.
43. See generally sources cited supra note 18.
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TABLE 9
DEATH SENTENCES FOR FEMALE OFFENDERS IN THE
NORTH CENTRAL CENSUS REGION BY RACE OF OFFENDER
AND PERIOD SENTENCED, 1973-92
Division
State
East North Central
Division:
Illinois
Indiana
Michigan
Ohio
Wisconsin
Race Period Sentenced
B W H '73-75 '76-80 '81-85 '86-90 '91-92 Totals
2-
2 2
6 3
Div. Totals 10 5 - 2 2 4 5 2 15
West North Central Division:
Iowa . . . . . .
Kansas . . . . .
Minnesota - - - - -
Missouri - 4 1 - - - 2 3 5
Nebraska . . . . .
No. Dakota . . . . .
So. Dakota . . . . .
Div. Totals - 4 1 - - - 2 3 5
Reg. Totals 10 9 1 2 2 4 7 5 20
Source: Victor L. Streib, Capital Punishment for Female Offenders: Present Female Death Row
Inmates and Death Sentences and Executions of Female Offenders (Jan. 1, 1973, to May I,
1992) (unpublished quarterly report available from author).
Female death-sentencing activity is spread over almost the entire re-
gion, with twelve of seventeen jurisdictions participating. The District
of Columbia and West Virginia have no death penalty at all, so can't
be expected to participate. The surprise may be Louisiana, which
ranks fifth among all jurisdictions with its twenty-eight female
executions" and which is heavily involved in sentencing and executing
males during the current era. In striking contrast to this record, Louis-
iana has not sentenced any female offenders to death at all during this
current era.
And what is happening in Florida and North Carolina? These states
have sentenced a total of twenty-five females to death in the current
era; they are by far the leaders in this region and in the entire United
44. See supra tbl. 6.
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TABLE 10
DEATH SENTENCES FOR FEMALE OFFENDERS IN THE
SOUTH CENSUS REGION BY RACE OF OFFENDER AND
PERIOD SENTENCED, 1973-92
Division
State
South Atlantic
Division:
Delaware
Dist. Col.
Florida
Georgia
Maryland
N. Carolina
S. Carolina
Virginia
West Virg.
Race
B W AI
2 10
1 4
- 1 2
2 9 1-12
Period Sentenced
H '73-75 '76-80 '81-85 '86-90 '91-92 Totals
Div. Totals 5 25 3 1 4 6 7 10 7 34
East South Central
Division:
Alabama 2 4 - - - 1 2 3 - 6
Kentucky - 2 - - - 1 - 1 - 2
Mississippi 2 3 - - - - 3 2 - 5
Tennessee - 1 - - - - - I - 1
Div. Totals 4 10 - - - 2 5 7 - 14
West South Central
Division:
Arkansas - 1 - - - 1 - - 1
Louisiana .-.--- - - - - - -
Oklahoma 1 5 - - 1 1 1 3 - 6
Texas 1 6 3 3 1 - 7
Div. Totals 2 12 - - 1 4 5 4 - 14
Reg. Totals 11 47 3 1 5 12 17 21 7 62
Source: Victor L. Streib, Capital Punishment for Female Offenders: Present Female Death Row
Inmates and Death Sentences and Executions of Female Offenders (Jan. 1, 1973, to May 1.
1992) (unpublished quarterly report available from author).
States. Even more strikingly, Florida's and North Carolina's com-
bined female death sentences since 1987 account for 39% (sixteen of
forty-one)45 of all female death sentences nationwide. In 1990, North
Carolina sentenced three (43%) of the total of seven females sen-
45. See infratbls. 13-14.
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tenced to death in the entire country that year. In the first four-and-
one-half months of 1992 (as of May 15, 1992), Florida imposed six
(75%) of the eight death sentences for females imposed nationally." s
Other surprises may be Oklahoma and Texas, which both have very
few actual executions of female offenders but now sentence female
offenders to death at a steady pace. Their thirteen such recent sen-
tences are more than three times their four actual executions. 47 In the
other vein, Virginia has executed a total of 112 female offenders but
has no female death sentences at all in this era.
The West Region persists in its almost total non-use of the death
penalty for female offenders, as is displayed in Table 11. California
continues its leadership with three recent sentences, two in the past
three years. Nevada has two sentences but has actually executed only
one female in its entire history." Idaho sentenced one woman to death
in 1984 but reversed that sentence in 198549 and has not sentenced any
more.
Table 12 compares the census regions and divisions. Predictably,
the South Region leads with 67% (sixty-two of ninety-two) of all fe-
male death sentences. This same Region accounted for 65%o of all
female executions and appears to be continuing its sentencing practice
at a remarkably similar level. Perhaps the major difference is with the
South Atlantic Division. It has accounted for 49%1 of all female exe-
cutions but only 37% (thirty-four of ninety-two) of all recent female
death sentences.
The North Central Region, particularly within the East North Cen-
tral Division, has also been quite active in sentencing female offenders
to death. This Division is second only to the South Region's South
Atlantic Division in total number of female death sentences. Much of
the credit goes to Ohio, only third among all states in recent sentences
for females.2 Ohio is tied for nineteenth in total actual executions of
female offenders. 3
Table 13 lists the twenty-two states that have sentenced females to
death during the current era. The leading states are all fairly predicta-
46. Streib, supra note 10.
47. Streib, supra note 10.
48. See supra tbl. 4.
49. State v. Windsor, 716 P.2d 1182 (Idaho 1986).
50. The South Region has executed 325 females out of the national total of 501 females
executed. See supra tbl. 5.
51. The South Atlantic Division has executed 243 females out of the national total of 501
females executed. Id.
52. Seeinfratbl. 13.
53. See supra tbl. 6.
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TABLE 11
DEATH SENTENCES FOR FEMALE OFFENDERS IN THE
WEST CENSUS REGION BY RACE OF OFFENDER AND
PERIOD SENTENCED, 1973-92
Division
State
Mountain Division:
Arizona
Colorado
Idaho
Montana
Nevada
New Mexico
Utah
Wyoming
Race Period Sentenced
B W '73-75 '76-80 '81-85 '86-90 '91-92 Totals
Div. Totals 1 3 - - 3 - 1 4
Pacific Division:
Alaska . . . . . . . .
California 1 2 1 - - 2 - 3
Hawaii . . . . . . . .
Oregon . . . . . . . .
Washington . . . . . . . .
Div. Totals 1 2 1 - - 2 - 3
Reg. Totals 2 5 1 - 3 2 1 7
Source: Victor L. Streib, Capital Punishment for Female Offenders: Present Female Death Row
Inmates and Death Sentences and Executions of Female Offenders (Jan. 1, 1973, to May 1,
1992) (unpublished quarterly report available from author).
ble except for Ohio, third in this list but far behind most other states
in sentencing male offenders to death. The most striking pattern is
that two-thirds of the death penalty states have sentenced female of-
fenders to death.14
Florida and Texas would be expected to rank high because they are
leading death penalty states in the current era. Another general leader,
California, is far back in the pack, and Louisiana (another general
leader) has not even made the list. Otherwise, the Deep South states
are all well-represented.
Viewed from another perspective, Table 14 lists the number of fe-
male and total death sentences imposed each year." A total of ninety-
54. See supra tbl. 6.
55. The primary source of the data in Table 14 for total death sentences per year is U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1990, at 677 (1991).
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TABLE 12
DEATH SENTENCES FOR FEMALE OFFENDERS BY RACE OF
OFFENDER, PERIOD SENTENCED, AND CENSUS DIVISION
AND REGION, 1973-92
Division
Northeast Region:
New England
Mid-Atlantic
Race
B W Al H'73-75
2 1
Period Sentenced
'76-80 '81-85 '86-90 '91-92 Totals
- 1 1 1 3
Reg. Totals 2 1 -- - 1 1 1 3
North Central
Region:
E. N. Cent. 10 5 2 2 4 5 2 15
W.N. Cent. - 4 - 1 - - - 2 3 5
Reg. Totals 10 9 - 1 2 2 4 7 5 20
South Region:
S. Atlantic 5 25 3 1 4 6 7 10 7 34
E. S. Atl. 4 10 --- 2 5 7 - 14
W. S. Atl. 2 12 -- 1 4 5 4 - 14
Reg. Totals 11 47 3 1 5 12 17 21 7 62
West Region:
Mountain 1 3 - - - - 3 - 1 4
Pacific 1 2 --- 1 - 2 - 3
Reg. Totals 2 5 - - - 1 3 2 1 7
Natl. Tots. 25 62 3 2 7 15 25 31 14 92
Source: Victor L. Streib, Capital Punishment for Female Offenders: Present Female Death Row
Inmates and Death Sentences and Executions of Female Offenders (Jan. 1, 1973, to May 1,
1992) (unpublished quarterly report available from author).
two female death sentences have been imposed, only 2% of the total
of about 4,570 death sentences for all offenders. Despite some fluctu-
ations, particularly in the early years of this period, the death sentenc-
ing rate for female offenders was typically about five per year
beginning in the 1980s. However, in 1989 this annual death sentencing
rate doubled for reasons unknown. Since 1990, the female death sen-
tencing rate seemed to have settled into a rate of about six or seven
per year, but accelerated noticeably in early 1992.
In summary, females have accounted for only 2.7% (501 of 18,309)
of all known executions. Since 1973 they have accounted for only 207o
of all death sentences, and the actual execution rate for female death
sentences is only 20 compared to 8% for male death sentences. Of
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TABLE 13
DEATH SENTENCES UNDER POST-FURMAN STATUTES FOR
FEMALE OFFENDERS BY JURISDICTION SINCE 1973
Florida 13 Mississippi 5 Kentucky 2
North Carolina 12 Missouri 5 Pennsylvania 2
Ohio 9 Indiana 4 Arizona 1
Texas 7 California 3 Arkansas 1
Alabama 6 Maryland 3 Idaho 1
Oklahoma 6 Nevada 2 New Jersey 1
Georgia 5 Illinois 2 South Carolina 1
Tennessee 1
TOTAL: 92
Source: Victor L. Streib, Capital Punishment for Female Offenders: Present Female Death Row
Inmates and Death Sentences and Executions of Female Offenders (Jan. 1, 1973, to May 1,
1992) (unpublished quarterly report available from author).
the 175 executions in the current era, only one (0.6%) has been of a
female offender. This tends to support the observation that although
the death penalty for female offenders has always been rare it is now
declining in use even more.
IV. CURRENT FEMALE DEATH Row INMATES
Of the ninety-two death sentences for females, only forty-three
(47qo), imposed on thirty-nine different women, remain in effect (see
Table 15). One (1%) resulted in an execution;5 6 the other forty-eight
(52%) have been reversed or commuted to life imprisonment. Thus,
for the forty-nine female death sentences finally resolved (excluding
the forty-three sentences still in effect and being litigated), the reversal
rate for female death sentences is 98%.
Only thirty-nine female offenders remain on the death rows of six-
teen states. Well over half of the offenders are white. Half were age
thirty or younger at the time of their crimes, with the total age range
from eighteen to sixty-seven. Two-thirds of their victims were white
and three-quarters were adult males (where these data are known).
Nearly one-half of these cases involved the murder of the offender's
husband or lover, surprisingly high at least compared to what we
know about the victims of males on death row.
As of May 15, 1992, the present ages of these thirty-nine female
death row inmates ranged from twenty-two to seventy-two years of
56. Velma Barfield, 1984. See supra note 25.
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TABLE 14
DEATH SENTENCES IMPOSED UPON FEMALE OFFENDERS,
1973-1992
Total Death Female Death Portion
Year Sentences Sentences of Total
1973 42 1 2.4%
1974 167 1 0.6%
1975 322 6 1.9%
1976 249 3 1.2%
1977 159 1 0.6%
1978 209 4 1.9%
1979 172 4 2.3%
1980 198 2 1.0%
1981 245 3 1.2%
1982 264 5 1.9%
1983 259 4 1.5%
1984 280 8 2.9%
1985 273 5 1.8%
1986 297 3 1.0%
1987 299 5 1.7%
1988 296 5 1.7%
1989 251 11 4.4%
1990 244 7 2.8%
1991 250* 6 2.4%
1992* 94* 8 8.5%
Totals: 4,570* 92 2.0%
*Estimates
**As of May 15, 1992
Source: Victor L. Streib, Capital Punishment for Female Offenders: Present Female Death Row
Inmates and Death Sentences and Executions of Female Offenders (Jan. 1, 1973, to May 1,
1992) (unpublished quarterly report available from author).
age. They had been on death row from one day" to ten years.5" De-
spite the statistically high probability that death-sentenced female of-
fenders will never be executed, some of these women have nearly
exhausted their appeals and would appear to be nearing execution. 9
57. Aileen Wuornos was sentenced to death in Ocala, Florida, on May 15, 1992. See supra
note 10. Ms. Wuornos was first given the death penalty some three months earlier. Prostitute
Sentenced to Death, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1992, at 9.
58. Priscilla Ford was sentenced to death in Nevada on April 29, 1982. See generally Ford
v. State, 717 P.2d 27 (Nev. 1986); Streib, supra note 10, at 11.
59. An example is the case of Judi Buenoano who had been scheduled for execution in
Florida on June 21, 1990, but then won stays of execution due to a malfunctioning electric chair.
Electric-Chair Dispute Brings Another Stay, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1990, at 11; Electric-Chair
Dispute Brings Execution Stay, N.Y. TIMEs, June 22, 1990, at A9.
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TABLE 15
CHARACTERISTICS OF OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS IN
FEMALE DEATH PENALTY CASES CURRENTLY IN FORCE,
MAY 15, 1992
Offenders
Age at Crime Race
Under 21 = 2 (500) B = 14 (36%)
21-30 = 18 (4601o) H = 2 (5%)
31-40 = 11 (280) W = 23 (59%)
41-50 = 4 (10%) 39 (10001o)
51-60 = 3 (8%)
61-70 = I (301o)
39 (100%)
Victims
Age Race Sex
Under 18 = 13 (24%) A = 1 (27o) M = 43 (72%)
18 & over =41 (76%) B = 16 (2801o) F = 17 (28%)
54 (100%) H = 2 (3%) 60 (10076)
W = 39 (67%)
Unknown = 7 58 (100%) Unknown = 1
61 Unknown = 3 61
Source: Victor L. Streib, Capital Punishment for Female Offenders: Present Female Death Row
Inmates and Death Sentences and Executions of Female Offenders (Jan. 1, 1973, to May 1,
1992) (unpublished quarterly report available from author).
V. CONCLUSIONS AND PROJECTIONS FROM THE DATA
The death penalty for female offenders has always been rare and is
becoming rarer. Executions of females have accounted for only 2.7%
of all executions, and recent death sentences for females have ac-
counted for only 2% of all death sentences. Actual executions of fem-
ales have been only 0.6% of all executions in the current era. Of the
last 144 executions, none have been females. While thirty-nine women
remain on death row, recent history suggests they have an extremely
small chance of actually being executed.
Roughly 10% to 15% of arrestees for homicide are females. Why
are only 201o of the people sentenced to death for homicide females?
Why do 98% of female death sentences get reversed or commuted?
Why do female offenders constitute less than I1% of those actually
executed? While some attention has been given these issues by re-
searchers,6° it is only beginning and much more needs to be done.
60. See, inter alia, Rapaport (1991), supra note 8; Rapaport (1990), supra note 8; Streib,
supra note 8; Streib & Sametz, supra note 8.
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In the midst of the declining use of the death penalty for female
offenders, a few jurisdictions such as North Carolina and Ohio seem
to be increasing its use. States such as Florida, Oklahoma, and Texas,
which have almost never executed female offenders, are now begin-
ning to sentence them to death. Thus, the death penalty for female
offenders may not be disappearing but simply changing its address.
These and related topics need serious attention by death penalty re-
searchers.
VI. APPLYING THE BATTERED WOMEN'S SYNDROME
Are the cases of death-sentenced female offenders fertile ground for
exploring the application of the Battered Women's Syndrome (BWS)6
and less serious levels of abuse against women? While the available
information is sketchy at best, some intriguing characteristics of many
of these cases invite digging further for evidence of battering among
these women.
In some cases, considerable evidence has been developed to show
serious abuse of the female offender by the husband/lover victim or
the husband/lover co-felon. 62 In other cases, the female offender is
described simplistically as only interested in the victim's life insurance,
but a few threads of evidence suggest her situation may have been
more complicated. 63 A third category seems to be cases in which the
female offender has made much of some relatively minor abuse by the
husband/lover victim or co-felon," appearing to be grasping at the
straw of the latest fad for excusing her homicide.
For the purposes of this Article, no in-depth analysis will be made
of the BWS. It suffices simply to refer to Lenore Walker's leading
works on BWS. 61 Walker generally describes a battered woman as one
"who is or has been in an intimate relationship with a man who re-
peatedly subjects or subjected her to forceful physical and/or psycho-
logical abuse." "6 Through a learned helplessness, the abused woman is
61. See infra notes 65-86 and accompanying text.
62. As an example, see the case of Betty Beets in Texas, described infra notes 98-108 and
accompanying text.
63. An example is the case of Barbara Stager in North Carolina. See generally State v.
Stager, 406 S.E.2d 876 (N.C. 1991).
64. An example is the case of Gaille Owens in Tennessee. See generally State v. Porterfield,
746 S.W,2d 441,444 (Tenn. 1988).
65. LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984) [hereinafter WALKER
(1984)]; and LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN (1979) [hereinafter WALKER (1979)].
For a wide variety of law review articles analyzing the applicability of BWS in various legal
situations, see supra notes 1-4.
66. WALKER (1984), supra note 65, at 203.
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unable to leave the relationship despite apparent opportunities to do
so. She continually is aware that the batterer presents a threat of im-
minent harm even during periods of relative calm in their relationship.
Battered women tend to have common characteristics:
1. Possessing low self-esteem;
2. Accepting responsibility for the batterer's actions;
3. Suffering from guilt yet denying the terror and anger they feel;
4. Presenting passive faces to the world;
5. Having severe stress reactions with psychophysiological com-
plaints;
6. Having traditional values about home and family; and
7. Believing that no one can help resolve the predicament but her-
self.67
A rough survey of the ocean of approximately 2,000 cases per year
of women arrested for murder or non-negligent homicide indicates
that where evidence of BWS or less serious battering not placing the
women into BWS is available, it is quite rare for the female offender
to be convicted of capital murder. If not an acceptable form of self-
defense justifying the homicide altogether, it is an incomplete defense
or a confused, impassioned state reducing the crime to some form of
manslaughter.
Approximately one-third of the thirty-nine women now on death
row involve victims who were either the offender's husband or lover.A8
At least another third involve women killing other victims in concert
with or at the direction of their husbands or lovers. 69 Roughly the
same proportions are true of the ninety-two death sentences for fe-
male offenders imposed since 1973.70 This suggests two broad catego-
ries of battered women who may face the death penalty-women who
kill their batterers and women who kill others to please or in concert
with their batterers.
VII. BATTERING AS AN EXPREss MITIGATING FACTOR
If it can be assumed for the purposes of this analysis that few bat-
tered women or victims of BWS ever get prosecuted for capital mur-
der, we can turn to an investigation of how evidence might be
important in those few cases in which they do face capital punish-
ment. Two approaches suggest themselves-express language in capi-
67. WALKER (1979), supra note 65, at 31.
68. Streib, supra note 10.
69. Streib, supra note 10.
70. Streib, supra note 10.
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tal punishment statutes and focused argument at the penalty phase by
trial counsel.
One use of evidence of battering or the BWS is already common-
place and need only be mentioned here. This is the use of such sympa-
thetic evidence under mitigating factors dealing with the defendant
being under extreme mental or emotional distress, under duress, or
under the substantial domination of another person. While typically
not expressly listed as a manifestation of these common mitigating
factors, such evidence when discovered and available to trial counsel
would easily be admissible.7 Just to avoid any confusion at the trial
level, legislatures should consider expressly listing evidence of batter-
ing or of the BWS as a separate and distinct mitigating factor in their
capital punishment statutes.
The problem, of course, is that trial counsel may not have discov-
ered such evidence, either because of the defendant's reluctance to ad-
mit it, her outright denial of the battering, or because of one of a
thousand reasons why defense counsel seldom get around to a thor-
ough harvesting of all mitigating evidence. While most common in
noncapital cases, such omissions by trial counsel also happen in capi-
tal cases and then appellate counsel scramble to do what they can af-
ter the prime opportunity is gone. Expressly listing battering as a
separate mitigating factor might both trigger in trial counsel's mind
the need to seek such specific evidence and require the prosecutor to
be sensitive to evidence on this issue particularly.
Express inclusion of evidence of battering or of BWS as a mitigat-
ing factor in capital sentencing should be applicable to all capital de-
fendants, regardless of whom their victims may have been. While
obviously those battered women who kill their batterers garner the
most sympathy and can argue most persuasively the mitigated serious-
ness of their homicides, battered women who kill third-party, com-
pletely "innocent" victims nonetheless have a unique partial
explanation for their otherwise unfathomable acts.
Consider two examples of battered women sentenced to death for
killing third-party victims. Judith Neelley presently is on death row in
Alabama for the kidnapping and murder of a thirteen-year-old girl in
71. The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the admissibility
of wide-ranging evidence of mitigating factors at capital sentencing hearings. See Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 536 (1978). An excellent analysis of
the more general applicability of battering and BWS in sentencing women can be found in Susan
L. Podebradsky & Mary E. Triggiano-Hunt, Comment, An Overview of Defense of Battered
Women From a Postconviction Perspective, 4 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 95 (1988).
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1982.72 Neelley and her husband concocted a ruse by which Neelley
picked up young girls, delivered them to her husband for his sexual
pleasures, and then got rid of them for him." In this case, Neelley and
her husband brutalized and sexually abused the girl for several days.74
Neelley then handcuffed the girl to a tree and gave her six injections
of caustic drain cleaner. 71 Failing to get a fatal result, Neelley shot the
girl in the back and threw her body off a cliff. 76
Neelley admitted all of this at trial and testified that she would have
killed others if her husband "had told her to."'77 According to Neel-
ley, all of her criminal acts had been ordered by her husband on pain
of severe beatings unless she did exactly as she was told. Neelley's
claims of repeated beatings and abuse led the defense psychologist to
conclude that Neelley suffered from BWS.78 The state psychiatrist,
however, rejected the diagnosis and expressed considerable doubt as
to the extent of her abuse.79
By any measure, the facts of this crime are shocking and could be
described as "demonic and savagely inhuman," 80 tending to push a
sentencer toward the death penalty. However, in Neelley's case the
jury voted ten-to-two for life imprisonment without parole instead of
for the death penalty.8' The trial judge nonetheless ordered the death
penalty .82
In Neelley's case, her attorney admitted all of the accusations and
more, leaving as the only contested issues Neelley's mental state and
legal culpability.83 The primary defense theme was that Neelley was
programmed by her husband to kidnap and kill at his direction.8
When this strategy failed at trial and Neelley was convicted of capital
murder, reorienting this defense claim to address Alabama's standard
mitigating categories was not a simple matter. 5
72. Neelley v. State, 494 So. 2d 669, 670-71 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985), aff'd, 494 So. 2d 697
(Ala. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 926 (1987).
73. Id. at 675. See also THOMAS KNUNCL & PAuL EINSTEIN, LADIES WHo KILL 49-69 (1985).
74. Sentencing Order, Circuit Court of DeKalb County, included as appendix III in Neel-
ley, 494 So. 2d at 689, 690.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 678.
78. Id. at 681.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 682.
81. Id. at 671,680.
82. Id. at 671.
83. Id. at 675.
84. Id. at 676.
85. Id. at 682.
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Given the jury's rejection of the death penalty despite the shocking
nature of the crime, it seems reasonable to assume that Neelley's men-
tal state was considered by the jury as "extreme mental or emotional
disturbance," as being "under the substantial domination of another
person," and/or as a lesser form of insanity not reaching the Ala-
bama level for a not guilty verdict.86 The trial judge, however, greatly
downplayed the weight to be given this evidence. His reasoning re-
flected a common ignorance of a basic tenet of BWS: "There were
numerous opportunities for the defendant to break with her husband
and seek help had she felt the need or been so inclined. These oppor-
tunities were enhanced by the fact that the defendant was armed and
traveling in a separate vehicle during most of their exploits.""s In
other words, Neelley appeared to have had the chance to escape her
batterer and the fact that she did not escape indicates not BWS but a
rational and willing choice to endure the battering and to do her bat-
terer's bidding.
If the Alabama death penalty statute had included an express miti-
gating circumstance dealing with battering and BWS, perhaps the ju-
rors would have had an easier time fitting their community sense of
proportion for retributive punishment into rigid statutory categories
and the trial judge might have been confronted with the classic condi-
tions to look for in BWS cases, including a learned helplessness pre-
venting BWS victims from leaving the relationship despite apparent
opportunities to do so.88
While many other cases exist, only one other illustration will be
mentioned. Debra Brown is under sentences of death in Indiana and
in Ohio for a series of kidnappings, rapes, and murders committed
along with her lover, Alton Coleman, in 1984.89 Brown is mildly re-
tarded and learning disabled and reportedly "grew up in an extremely
abusive home with a father who was mentally ill and alcoholic.'"'9
Suffering from "child-like emotional development, excessive reliance
on others and proneness to manipulation by others," 9' Brown claims
86. Id.
87. Sentencing Order, Circuit Court of DeKalb County, included as appendix III in Neel-
ley, 494 So. 2d at 689, 693.
88. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
89. See Brown v. State, 528 N.E.2d 523 (Ohio 1988); Brown v. State, 532 N.E.2d 608 (Ind.
1989); Brown Gets Another Sentence of Death, PosT TwB. (Gary, Ind.), June 24, 1986, at BI;
Extradition Decision is Up to Ohio, PLAiN DEALER (Cleveland), Jan. 14, 1991, at D12.
90. RANDALL DANA, SummARY REPORT ON SENTENCE COMMUTATIONS 7 (Jan. 10, 1991); 8
Death Sentences Commuted in Ohio, N.Y. TIms, Jan. 12, 1991, at 11.
91. DANA, supra note 90, at 7.
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hers was a master-slave relationship with Coleman and that she partic-
ipated in the crimes solely out of fear of him. 92
Brown was convicted and sentenced to death first in Ohio and then
in Indiana under death penalty statutes with broad provisions for mit-
igating evidence but with no express provisions for evidence of batter-
ing or BWS. 93 Either a separate mitigating factor for such
consideration or at least express mention of it under more general cat-
egories might have insured that Brown's dilemma came to the direct
attention of those who sentenced her to die.
IIX. PRECLUDING BWS ViCnI s FROM THE DEATH PENALTY
Perhaps the law should consider going the next mile in the most
extenuated cases of victims of BWS who kill their batterers. Legisla-
tures could amend their capital punishment statutes to preclude in all
cases the imposition of the death penalty on these women. Capital
punishment law has continually stressed the need to narrow the cate-
gory of homicides to select only the very worst crimes and the most
reprehensible defendants for the ultimate punishment.9 In the rare
category of cases to be excluded here, the crime is not quite so heinous
given the past behavior of the victim and the defendant is not quite so
condemnable given the circumstances under which she functioned. 95
Remember that only 207o to 3% of all females arrested for murder
or non-negligent homicide are ever sentenced to death, and only a tiny
fraction of those sentenced will ever actually be executed. That is, at
least 97% of all women who kill are already screened out of the capi-
tal punishment process. Legislators could say categorically that BWS
women who kill their batterers, while not necessarily excused or given
special access to claims of self-defense, are nonetheless in the bottom
97% in seriousness of their offenses. Similar categorical exclusions by
legislatures have been made commonly for juveniles" and more rarely
92. 8 Death Sentences Commuted, supra note 90.
93. See IND. CODE § 35-41-1-1 (1991); Oino REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.04 (Baldwin 1991).
94. The United States Supreme Court has held repeatedly that capital punishment systems
must screen and narrow the cases they consider to reach the residue deserving the death penalty.
See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
95. The United States Supreme Court has established two primary criteria in choosing be-
tween life imprisonment and the death penalty: (1) the nature and seriousness of the crime and
(2) the character and background of the defendant. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, Ill S. Ct.
2597 (1991); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Gregg, 428 U.S. 153; Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
96. See, e.g., statutes collectively cited in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370 n.2
(1989) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 829-30 n.30 (1988)
(Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
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for the mentally retarded, 97 not excusing their behavior but not per-
mitting the whims of local prosecutors to place such offenders' very
lives in peril.
Again consider recent examples of such cases. Betty Beets was sen-
tenced to death directly for the 1983 murder of her husband and indi-
rectly for the 1981 murder of her former husband, their bodies having
been found buried in her yard.98 While Beets' original trial counsel
presented no defense or mitigation based on battering, Beets' extraor-
dinary history as a victim of repeated battering by a succession of five
husbands over a period of thirty years was uncovered only later by her
appellate attorneys."
A classic example of a BWS victim, Beets progressed from an
abused childhood with hearing and learning disabilities"m to a night-
marish adulthood with severe alcoholism and organic brain damage.' 0'
Having been abandoned and divorced by her first battering hus-
band,'0 2 Beets divorced her second battering husband but that didn't
end the abuse. 0 3 He continued to search her out and inflict severe
beatings, ending only when she shot him (nonfatally).'04 Following a
short marriage to her third battering husband,' 5 in 1979 Beets entered
97. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
98. Beets v. State, 767 S.W.2d 711, 714, 718-19 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), cert. denied, 492
U.S. 912 (1989).
99. See Pet'r Br. at 46-88, Ex Parte Betty Lou Beets (Cause No. A-3 144-A), relief denied,
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Post Conviction Writ of Habeas Corpus Proce-
dural Statement, Writ No. 20,582-02 (Dist. Ct. Henderson County, Tx. Apr. 3, 1990).
100. Id. at 46-52. Citing the report by Dr. Lenore Walker on Beets, the Petitioner's Brief
summarized Beets' childhood predicament in discouraging terms:
She failed the fourth grade. Her hearing impairment was further exacerbated by her
learning disabilities. Betty was unable to comprehend speech and language related
subjects the way normal children did. Her brain-injured by encephalitis, malnutri-
tion, fever, or birth trauma-did not allow her to learn, despite her desperate efforts
to keep up with the other children. She was a hearing-impaired, learning disabled
child, confused, humiliated and isolated by her inability to be like other children.
Id. at 49.
101. Again relying on Dr. Walker's analysis, Petitioner's Brief characterized Beets' life at the
time she murdered her fifth husband as follows:
By the time Betty met and married Jimmy Don Beets in 1982, her mind and body had
been ravaged by maltreatment, chronic illness and neglect as a child, constant threats
of annihilation by those who swore their love, repeated head injuries, and alcohol and
drug dependency. Nightmares plagued her, and she was unable to prevent intrusive
thoughts of the physical violence and emotional abuse she endured. She bought five
cases of beer weekly and ate five or six diet pills a day. An alcoholic haze help block
her deep seeded fears and insecurities.
Id. at 67.
102. Id. at 52-54.
103. Id. at 56-59.
104. Id. at 59-60.
105. Id. at 62-63.
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yet a fourth marriage to an alcoholic, abusive husband.'°6 When a di-
vorce in 1980 didn't end the battering, Beets shot and killed him as he
slept, her crime being discovered only many years later. 07 Her fifth
husband turned out to be the same as his predecessors, and Beets shot
him also, this time resulting in a conviction of murder and a sentence
of death. 108
In such a clear case of BWS, assuming it is established by the de-
fense, a capital punishment statute might expressly exclude the BWS
victim from the death penalty regardless of her crime. Texas, for ex-
ample, has excluded all persons under age seventeen from death pen-
alty consideration since the last century'09 and could enact comparable
provisions for the similarly extenuating situation of a BWS victim
such as Betty Beets.
One last example is the case of Shirley Tyler in Georgia, sentenced
to death for poisoning her husband in 1979.11o Her death sentence was
vacated six years later because of ineffective assistance of counsel at
her sentencing hearing."' The Eleventh Circuit noted that a variety of
mitigating evidence could have been submitted, including evidence of
battering:
ITIhat her husband was drunk and abusive at times and had knocked
out some of her teeth when drunk; that she and her children moved
away at one time because he drank and beat her; that on one
occasion he put her out of the house in her night clothes. "2
Add to this Tyler's statement that she killed her husband to prevent
him from continuing to beat her son." 3
Tyler's attorneys on appeal argued among other things that the
death penalty for a domestic murder was disproportionately severe
and thus cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment." 4 This argument was dismissed out of hand by both the
Georgia Supreme Court"' and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit, " with the former observing, "[s]ome of the
106. Id. at 63.
107. Id. at 65.
108. Beets, 767 S.W.2d 711.
109. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.07(d) (West 1991).
110. Tyler v. State, 274 S.E.2d 549 (Ga. 1981).
111. Tyler v. Kemp, 755 F.2d 741 (11th Cir. 1985).
112. Id. at 745.
113. Tyler, 274 S.E.2d at 552.
114. Kemp, 755 F.2d at 747-48; Tyler, 274 S.E.2d at 555.
115. Tyler, 274 S.E.2d at 555.
116. Kemp, 755 F.2d at 747-48.
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more vile, horrible or inhuman homicides have been perpetrated by
family members against one another." 1 7
Without challenging either the Georgia Supreme Court's observa-
tion or the Eleventh Circuit's refusal to give blanket Eighth Amend-
ment death penalty exemption to all domestic murders, the much
narrower argument can be made that domestic murders involving
BWS victims killing their batterers should receive a statutory exemp-
tion. Presumably, a substantial number of enactments of such statu-
tory exemptions might ultimately add up to a new standard of decency
upon which could be based a new Eighth Amendment ruling," 8 but
this Article proposes only a modest legislative beginning.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
The death penalty for female offenders continues to be a very rare
thread through the current American practice of imposing the death
penalty for murder. It always has been so. While reluctant to be cast
in the role of urging states to terminate the lives of several more
wretched sisters in order to achieve gender parity," 9 one must be sus-
picious of the extraordinarily low rate of death sentences and execu-
tions for female offenders. More would have been expected, absent
some inherent gender bias in the capital punishment system. I20
While perhaps adding to the apparent gender disparity even more,
special treatment for battered women does seem warranted. Two lev-
els of special treatment in death penalty statutes are recommended: (1)
an express mitigating factor on battering and BWS regardless of
whom the victim was, and (2) an express preclusion of the death pen-
alty in the most extreme cases, BWS women who kill their batterers.
117. Tyler, 274 S.E.2d at 555.
118. The Supreme Court has made clear that the Eighth Amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishments is to be interpreted "in a flexible and dynamic manner." Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976) (opinion by Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). Defendants
attempt to characterize their punishments as contrary to the "evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (Warren,
C.J., plurality opinion). Even if permitted when the Eighth Amendment was adopted, a particu-
lar application of capital punishment could come to be considered unconstitutional should socie-
tal standards change significantly over time. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988)
(prohibiting capital punishment for crimes committed while under age sixteen); see also Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (prohibiting capital punishment for crimes of rape).
119. 1 am indebted to Elizabeth Rapaport for first pinning this dramatic phrase. RAPAPORT
(1991), supra note 8, at 368 ("At worst, it suggests a campaign to exterminate a few more
wretched sisters."). Professor Rapaport has similarly rejected this path to equality. See, e.g.,
RAPAPORT (1991), supra note 8, at 381; RAPAPORT (1990), supra note 8, at 564.
120. Professor Rapaport does not share this suspicion of gender-bias. See RAPAPORT (1991),
supra note 8, at 382; RAPAPORT (1990), supra note 8, at 510-1I.
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Such a policy would affect very few cases because such small num-
bers are involved, presumably deflecting any argument as to any sig-
nificant negative effect on a supposed general deterrence of the death
penalty or make its proponents appear to be soft on crime. Indeed, a
proposal for special treatment of battered women within death pen-
alty law might bring participants in the victims' rights movement into
the death penalty debate. If they begin to discuss this narrow issue
and to work together to gain its acceptance, perhaps it might facilitate
further dialogue and discourse toward understanding the involvement
of women in violent crime both as perpetrators and as victims.
